

MQQ – A Public Key Block Cipher

Presented by Danilo Gligoroski

Department of Telematics, Faculty of Information Technology,
Mathematics and Electrical Engineering,

The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU),
O.S.Bragstads plass 2E, N-7491 Trondheim,

Name MQQ comes from

Multivariate Quadratic Quasigroup

- **Developers**

Danilo Gligoroski
Smile Markovski and
Svein Johan Knapskog

- **Implementers**

Danilo Gligoroski (in C)
Mohamed El-Hadedy (in VHDL)

- **References and links**

- [1] D. Gligoroski, S. Markovski and S. J. Knapskog, “Multivariate Quadratic Trapdoor Functions Based on Multivariate Quadratic Quasigroups”, Proceedings of MATH '08, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008.
- [2] D. Gligoroski, S. Markovski and S. J. Knapskog, “Public Key Block Cipher Based on Multivariate Quadratic Quasigroups”, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/320, <http://eprint.iacr.org/>
- [3] M. El-Hadedy, D. Gligoroski and S. J. Knapskog, “High Performance Implementation of a Public Key Block Cipher - MQQ, for FPGA Platforms”, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/339, <http://eprint.iacr.org/>

Properties of MQQ

1. MQQ is Multivariate Quadratic trapdoor function based on theory of quasigroups and quasigroup string transformations;
2. A deterministic one-to-one mapping;
3. There is no message expansion;
4. It has one parameter n (140, 160, 180, ...) - the bit length of the encrypted block;
5. Its conjectured security level when $n \geq 140$ bits is $2^{n/2}$;
6. Its encryption speed is comparable to the speed of other multivariate quadratic PKCs;
7. Its decryption/signature speed is as a typical symmetric block cipher;
8. MQQ is a Public Key Block Cipher.

Multivariate Quadratic Quasigroups

\mathcal{F}_{Q2S}

- Crucial observation that led to the new public key algorithm
 - Multivariate Quadratic Quasigroups
 - There are quasigroups of order 2^d , that when represented in their Algebraic Normal Form, they are Multivariate Quadratic

Example

*	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
0	3	2	6	7	1	0	4	5
1	5	3	7	1	0	6	2	4
2	0	6	3	5	4	2	7	1
3	6	7	2	3	5	4	1	0
4	7	1	4	2	3	5	0	6
5	1	0	5	4	2	3	6	7
6	4	5	1	0	6	7	3	2
7	2	4	0	6	7	1	5	3

\	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
0	5	4	1	0	6	7	2	3
1	4	3	6	1	7	0	5	2
2	0	7	5	2	4	3	1	6
3	7	6	2	3	5	4	0	1
4	6	1	3	4	2	5	7	0
5	1	0	4	5	3	2	6	7
6	3	2	7	6	0	1	4	5
7	2	5	0	7	1	6	3	4

$$*_{vv}(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 + x_3 + x_1x_4 + x_2x_4 + x_3x_4 + x_5 + x_1x_5 + x_2x_5 + x_3x_5 + x_1x_6 + x_2x_6 + x_3x_6 \\ 1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_1x_4 + x_2x_4 + x_3x_4 + x_1x_5 + x_2x_5 + x_3x_5 + x_1x_6 + x_2x_6 + x_3x_6 \\ 1 + x_2 + x_3x_4 + x_5 + x_3x_5 + x_6 + x_1x_6 + x_2x_6 + x_3x_6 \end{bmatrix}^T$$

$$\backslash_{vv}(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 + x_2 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_1x_4 + x_2x_4 + x_1x_3x_4 + x_2x_3x_4 + x_5 + x_3x_5 + x_1x_3x_5 + x_2x_3x_5 + \\ + x_1x_6 + x_2x_6 + x_3x_6 \\ x_1 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_4 + x_1x_4 + x_2x_4 + x_1x_3x_4 + x_2x_3x_4 + x_3x_5 + x_1x_3x_5 + x_2x_3x_5 + x_1x_6 + \\ + x_2x_6 + x_3x_6 \\ 1 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_1x_4 + x_2x_4 + x_1x_5 + x_2x_5 + x_6 \end{bmatrix}^T$$

Conjectured strength of MQQ

 $f_{\mathbb{Q}^2\mathbb{S}}$

n	140	160	180	200
Complexity of Grobner basis attacks	2^{87}	2^{99}	2^{112}	2^{125}
Strength of our MQQ PKC	2^{70}	2^{80}	2^{90}	2^{100}

Table 8: Complexity of the Gröbner basis attacks for different number of variables n and the strength of MQQ against Gröbner basis attacks.

C implementation of MQQ



Algorithm name	Encrypt (cycles)	Decrypt (cycles)	Sign (cycles)	Verify (cycles)
DSA signatures using a 1024-bit prime	N/A	N/A	1,041,400	1,246,312
ECDSA signatures using NIST B-163 elliptic curve	N/A	N/A	2,147,128	4,220,480
1024-bit RSA, 17 bits public exponent	119,800	2,952,752	2,938,632	98,712
160-bit MQQ, one processor	140,485	10,705	10,309	140,209
160-bit MQQ, two processors	80,105	6,212	6,155	79,903

Software speeds (in number of cycles) of several most popular public key algorithms on Intel Core 2 Duo processor in 64-bit mode of operation.

DSA, ECDSA and RSA numbers are taken from eBATS: ECRYPT Benchmarking of Asymmetric Systems

VHDL (FPGA) implementation f_{Q2S} of MQQ

Algorithm name	1024-bit RSA, encrypt/decrypt	160-bit MQQ, encrypt/decrypt	128-bit AES, encrypt/decrypt
FPGA type	Virtex-5, XC5VLX30-3	Virtex-5, XC5VFX70T-2	Virtex-5
Frequency	251 MHz	276.7 / 249.4 MHz	325 MHz
Throughput	40 Kbps	44.27 Gbps / 399.04 Mbps	3.78 Gbps

VHDL (FPGA) implementation f_{Q2S} of MQQ

Algorithm name	1024-bit RSA, encrypt/decrypt	160-bit MQQ, encrypt/decrypt	128-bit AES, encrypt/decrypt
FPGA type	Virtex-5, XC5VLX30-3	Virtex-5, XC5VFX70T-2	Virtex-5
Frequency	251 MHz	276.7 / 249.4 MHz	325 MHz
Throughput	40 Kbps	44.27 Gbps / 399.04 Mbps	3.78 Gbps

Compared to 1024-bit RSA, 160-bit MQQ is more than 17,000 times faster in encryption and more than 10,000 times faster in decryption.

Classification according to parallelization properties of the public key algorithms

Essentially sequential

- Diffie-Hellman
- RSA
- ECC

Highly parallelizable (multivariate polynomials)

- HFE
- UOV
- MQQ
- NTRU

Perspectives of public key algorithms based on multivariate


A Slide from Jack Dongarra's presentation at SIAM 2008 annual meeting (July 2008)



Something's Happening Here...

From K. Olukotun, L. Hammond, H. Sutter, and B. Smith

A hardware issue just became a software problem



- In the “old days” it was: each year processors would become faster
- Today the clock speed is fixed or getting slower
- Things are still doubling every 18 -24 months
- Moore’s Law reinterpreted.
 - Number of cores double every 18-24 months

Perspectives of public key algorithms based on multivariate polynomials

f_{Q2S}




Something's Happening Here...

From K. Olukotun, L. Hammond, H. Sutter, and B. Smith

A hardware issue just became a software problem

What about crypto algorithms?



- In the “old days” it was: each year processors would become faster
- Today the clock speed is fixed or getting slower
- Things are still doubling every 18 -24 months
- Moore’s Law reinterpreted.
 - Number of cores double every 18-24 months

Perspectives of public key algorithms based on multivariate polynomials

f_{Q2S}




Something's Happening Here...

From K. Olukotun, L. Hammond, H. Sutter, and B. Smith

A hardware issue just became a software problem

What about crypto algorithms?

What about Public Key algorithms?



- In the “old days” it was: each year processors would become faster
- Today the clock speed is fixed or getting slower
- Things are still doubling every 18 -24 months
- Moore’s Law reinterpreted.
 - Number of cores double every 18-24 months

Thank you for your attention!