Hacking Paper Some Random Attacks on Paper-Based E2E Systems

John Kelsey, NIST
Andrew Regenscheid, NIST
Tal Moran, Weizmann
David Chaum

End to end voting system

- Voter interacts with system
 - Gets receipt
- System counts votes and publishes results
- Voter can verify their vote included in total from receipt
 - But must not be able to use to sell vote!
- Anyone can verify vote count correct
- Examples: Punchscan, Pret-a-Voter, Threeballot

Scratch-Off Cards

- Physical device to give us this property:
 - First you must commit to a challenge
 - Then you get some hidden information
 - You can't undo the challenge and cover it back up.

```
Smith's Position

1 2 3 4

a # # # #

b # # # #

c # # # #

d # # # #
```

```
Smith's Position


1 2 3 4
a # # # #
b # # F #
c # # # #
d # # # #
```

Pret a Voter

- Internals very similar to Punchscan
- Ballot in two halves:
 - Left has candidate names in random order
 - Right has boxes/blanks to fill in.
- Voter may either audit blank ballot
 - Get receipt with opened ballot
- Or vote right side
 - Get copy of right side as receipt.

Pret-A-Voter Picture

- Voter gets ballot
 - May audit ballot or vote it
- To vote, mark choice and detach ballot; copy of scanned ballot is your receipt
- To audit, scan blank ballot and get back receipt showing correct left side.



Applying the attack to Pret-a-Voter

President	%%%
Smith	24e
Jones Baker	
White	

```
Last digit of serial number

0 5 a f k p v
... |... |... |... |... |...

4 9 e j o t z
# # # # # #

Smith blank:

1 2 3 4
# # # #

AUDIT WHEN SUM%10 ==9
```

- 1 Commit to S/N and ballot. 2 May be:
 - --required to audit/open
 - --required to vote according to commitment.

```
Last digit of serial number

0 5 a f k p v
... |... |... |... |...

4 9 e j o t z
# # 4 # # #

Smith blank:

1 2 3 4

5 # # #

AUDIT WHEN SUM%10 ==9
```

Wider application to many end-to-end schemes

- Punchscan
- Some variants of ThreeBallot