



Preimage Attacks on MD, HAVAL, SHA, and Others



<i>MD4</i>	<i>HAVAL-3</i>	<i>SHA-0</i>	<i>HAS-160</i>
<i>MD5</i>	<i>HAVAL-4</i>	<i>SHA-1</i>	<i>RIPEMD</i>
	<i>HAVAL-5</i>	<i>SHA-2</i>	

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Security of Hash Functions

- **Collision resistance**

- has been broken in many hash functions by Prof. Wang's great work.

- **Preimage resistance**

- is more important.
- is not analyzed well yet.

We propose preimage attacks on **10** hash functions.

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Chinese Trick

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
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Japanese Illusion !!

We propose preimage attacks on **10** hash functions.


Previous State

 : Collision




Previous State

■ : Collision
■ : Preimage




Our Result

- : Collision
- : Preimage (old)
- : Preimage (new)




Our Result

- : Collision
- : Preimage (old)
- : Preimage (new)




Our Result

█ : Collision
█ : Preimage (old)
█ : Preimage (new)




Our Result

- █ : Collision
- █ : Preimage (old)
- █ : Preimage (new)




Our Result

- █ : Collision
- █ : Preimage (old)
- █ : Preimage (new)




Our Result

■ : Collision
■ : Preimage (old)
■ : Preimage (new)




Our Result

- █ : Collision
- █ : Preimage (old)
- █ : Preimage (new)




Our Result

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
Our Result

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Our Result

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- : Preimage (old)
- : Preimage (new)



MD4 (48-step, 128-bit)

Previous

– Laurent [FSE08] 48-step $2^{100.5}$
(full)

New (SAC08)


48-step 2^{107}
(full)

MD4 (48-step, 128-bit)

Previous

– Laurent [FSE08] 48-step (full) $2^{100.5}$


Using iterative structure of Merkle–Damgård



New (SAC08)

48-step (full) 2^{107}

Attack of single compression function



MD5 (64-step, 128-bit)

Previous

- Aumasson, Meier, Mendel [SAC08] 47-step 2^{102}

New (SAC08)

63-step 2^{121}

64-step (full) 2^{127}

MD5 (64-step, 128-bit)

Previous

– Aumasson, Meier, Mendel [SAC08]  47-step 2^{102}


New (SAC08)

63-step

2^{121}

64-step (full)

2^{127}



MD5 (64-step, 128-bit)

Previous

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New (SAC08)

63-step

2^{121}

64-step (full)

2^{127}



Break !!

HAVAL-3 (96-step, 256-bit)

Previous

– Aumasson, Meier, Mendel [SAC08] 96-step 2^{230}
(full)

New

To appear in Asiacrypt 2008

96-step **2^{225}**
(full)

HAVAL-3 (96-step, 256-bit)

Previous

*Best attack on
HAVAL-3 !!*

– Aumasson, Meier, Mendel [SAC08] 96-step 2^{230}
(full)

New

To appear in Asiacrypt 2008

96-step **2^{225}**
(full)

HAVAL-4 (128-step, 256-bit)

Previous

none

New

To appear in Asiacrypt 2008

128-step
(full)

2^{241}

HAVAL-4 (128-step, 256-bit)

Previous

none

*Surprisingly, 128-steps
can be inverted !!*

New

To appear in Asiacrypt 2008

128-step
(full)

2^{241}

HAVAL-5 (160-step, 256-bit)

Previous

none

New

To appear in Asiacrypt 2008

151-step **2^{241}**

160-step (full) **2^{255}**

HAVAL-5 (160-step, 256-bit)

Previous

none

*Even 151-steps
can be inverted !!*

New

To appear in Asiacrypt 2008

151-step 2^{241}

160-step (full) 2^{255}

SHA-0 (80-step, 160-bit)

Previous

– Cannière, Rechberger [Crypto08] 49-step 2^{159}

New

36-step **2^{153}**

SHA-1 (80-step, 160-bit)

Previous

– Cannière, Rechberger [Crypto08] 44-step 2^{157}

New

34-step **$2^{153.5}$**

SHA-2 (64-step, 256-bit)

Previous

none

* Best collision attack: 24-step

New

36-step

2^{249}

SHA-2 (64-step, 256-bit)

Previous

none

* Best collision attack: 24-step

New

36-step

2^{249}

*Preimage attack works
more steps than
collision attack !!*

HAS-160 (80-step, 160-bit)

Previous

none

* Collision attack until 59-step

New

52-step

2^{153}

RIPEMD (48-step, 128-bit, 2-branch)

Previous

none

New

33-step

2^{125}

RIPEMD (48-step, 128-bit, 2-branch)

Previous

none

*Also work for
2-branch hash !!*

New


33-step

2^{125}

Summary of Our Results

Target	(Step, Output bit)	Previous	New	Comp.
MD4	(48, 128)	48 (Full)	48 (Full)	2^{107}
MD5	(64, 128)	47	64 (Full)	2^{127}
HAVAL-3	(96, 256)	96 (Full)	96 (Full)	2^{225}
HAVAL-4	(128, 256)	–	128 (Full)	2^{241}
HAVAL-5	(160, 256)	–	160 (Full)	2^{255}
SHA-0	(80, 160)	49	36 (45%)	2^{153}
SHA-1	(80, 160)	44	34 (43%)	$2^{153.5}$
SHA-256	(64, 256)	–	36 (56%)	2^{249}
HAS-160	(80, 160)	–	52 (65%)	2^{153}
RIPEMD	(48, 128)	–	33 (69%)	2^{125}

Messages from us



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- Need to be careful for preimage attack.
- NIST requires 2^n for preimage resistance.
- Our work is still on going.

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Thanks for your attention !!